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Centripetal Structure under Alienation-Based Abstention — arXiv:2608.03788

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03788
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-31T12:48:37.044Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
a0daf32f9bb4c3b0cb78b0726c142ddde442fc4aeb889655fd63000bf1a11abc
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ffb36e645389

How to cite

Centripetal Structure under Alienation-Based Abstention — arXiv:2608.03788 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03788 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ffb36e645389 (Metraipolis archive dc_ffb36e645389, sha256 a0daf32f9bb4c3b0cb78b0726c142ddde442fc4aeb889655fd63000bf1a11abc)
BibTeX
@misc{dcffb36e645389,
  title = {Centripetal Structure under Alienation-Based Abstention — arXiv:2608.03788},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03788},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ffb36e645389; sha256 a0daf32f9bb4c3b0cb78b0726c142ddde442fc4aeb889655fd63000bf1a11abc},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03788. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Alienation-based abstention makes participation endogenous because the platforms chosen by parties determine who votes. We study how voter tolerance affects the existence, location, and persistence of pure-strategy equilibria in two versions of a two-party spatial model. In the first, office-seeking parties maximize voter plurality; in the second, they care about the policy implemented. We characterize all office-seeking equilibria through a condition called window dominance, which gives a distributional characterisation of profitable deviations both near to and far from a party's platform. For general continuous voter distributions, pure strategy equilibrium in the office seeking game may fail to exist, may be non-unique, and may appear and disappear as tolerance increases. To resolve this, we identify a centripetal structure in the set of positions that can not lose to each rival. When this structure holds, a single anchor defeats every other platform and determines the unique office-seeking equilibrium. The classical Downs and Llavador results are special cases. We show that this structure persists at all larger tolerance radii once it holds at a radius of at least half the policy space and at least twice the median's distance from the center. The centripetal structure emerges before full participation for all voter distributions. Finally, the same structure yields a complete classification of equilibrium when parties care about the policy implemented rather than electoral victory alone.

Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-05 in math.OC).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) ; Optimization and Control (math.OC).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.03788 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-31T12:35:48.824Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/math.OC/2026-08-05?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).