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Robust prizes in all-pay contests with loss aversion — arXiv:2611.07419
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07419
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-06T14:59:05.306Z
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Robust prizes in all-pay contests with loss aversion — arXiv:2611.07419 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07419 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ffac93e0c405 (Metraipolis archive dc_ffac93e0c405, sha256 b4465053f8221e813aed9a78ca1e34096156e404283b92469310e36f7bd46e7a)
BibTeX
@misc{dcffac93e0c405,
title = {Robust prizes in all-pay contests with loss aversion — arXiv:2611.07419},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07419},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ffac93e0c405; sha256 b4465053f8221e813aed9a78ca1e34096156e404283b92469310e36f7bd46e7a},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07419. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We study robust prize design in all-pay contests with loss-averse agents when the principal does not know the agents' convex cost of effort, subject to an aggregate productivity constraint. The robustly optimal prize structure awards equal prizes to all contestants except the one ranked last. The optimal bottom prize is zero under moderate loss aversion, but becomes positive and increases with loss aversion when loss aversion is sufficiently strong. Under strong loss aversion, the robust solution involves partial participation in the contest. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07419 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-06T14:41:21.100Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).