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A Zero-Knowledge Signature Framework for Efficient Post-Quantum Message Authentication in Cooperative Automated Driving — arXiv:2610.11490

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11490
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-09T06:20:29.876Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: 79f4f646b0d3b483bca6a4c6fe93e776ba82ed0160f2d348104185d8f766a8a9
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ff54a2f34a67

How to cite

A Zero-Knowledge Signature Framework for Efficient Post-Quantum Message Authentication in Cooperative Automated Driving — arXiv:2610.11490 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11490 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ff54a2f34a67 (Metraipolis archive dc_ff54a2f34a67, sha256 79f4f646b0d3b483bca6a4c6fe93e776ba82ed0160f2d348104185d8f766a8a9)

BibTeX

@misc{dcff54a2f34a67,
  title = {A Zero-Knowledge Signature Framework for Efficient Post-Quantum Message Authentication in Cooperative Automated Driving — arXiv:2610.11490},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11490},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ff54a2f34a67; sha256 79f4f646b0d3b483bca6a4c6fe93e776ba82ed0160f2d348104185d8f766a8a9},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11490. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Connected and Automated Vehicles (CAV) rely on authenticated Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communications to exchange safety-critical information among vehicles and roadside infrastructure. As the automotive industry transitions toward post-quantum cryptography (PQC), the significantly larger public keys and signatures of standardized PQC digital signature algorithms introduce substantial communication overhead, which challenges the scalability of certificate-based V2X authentication, particularly for high-frequency cooperative awareness messages (CAM). This paper presents ZKS-PQC, a zero-knowledge signature framework that enables communication-efficient post-quantum message authentication for cooperative V2X systems. Instead of transmitting complete post-quantum public keys and signatures, the proposed framework replaces this authentication material with a compact Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) while preserving compatibility with existing certificate-based trust architectures. This approach supports incremental migration and backward compatibility with the legacy ECDSA. The framework is implemented using the Open Quantum Safe (liboqs) and ZKP (Bulletproofs) libraries, and we evaluated the performance of standardized NIST PQC signature algorithms and additional candidate algorithms. Experimental validation on both a Linux platform and a commercial On-Board Unit (OBU) demonstrates substantial reductions in message size exceeding 95% for all algorithms, while limiting additional processing overhead by staying within the order of milliseconds at both sender and receiver in many algorithms, consistent with the latency requirements of real-time V2X operation. By decoupling communication overhead from the size characteristics of post-quantum signature algorithms, ZKS-PQC offers a practical migration strategy for scalable, quantum-resilient message authentication in future CAV systems.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11490 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-09T05:50:00.894Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).