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DisC: Incentive Design for Green, Robust, and Fair Client Self-Participation in OTA Federated Learning — arXiv:2611.03024
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03024
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-03T18:28:53.608Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
0959fdbe1e5da52e324a5d4f50009067a67c8735f8b8f4ab863da1988164d016- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
DisC: Incentive Design for Green, Robust, and Fair Client Self-Participation in OTA Federated Learning — arXiv:2611.03024 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03024 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fe5fd271ac53 (Metraipolis archive dc_fe5fd271ac53, sha256 0959fdbe1e5da52e324a5d4f50009067a67c8735f8b8f4ab863da1988164d016)
BibTeX
@misc{dcfe5fd271ac53,
title = {DisC: Incentive Design for Green, Robust, and Fair Client Self-Participation in OTA Federated Learning — arXiv:2611.03024},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03024},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fe5fd271ac53; sha256 0959fdbe1e5da52e324a5d4f50009067a67c8735f8b8f4ab863da1988164d016},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03024. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Over-the-Air Federated Learning (OTA-FL) improves communication efficiency by exploiting waveform superposition over wireless Multiple-Access Channels (MAC). However, client heterogeneity, fading, energy constraints, and participation imbalance can degrade both fairness and aggregation accuracy. Existing Pareto-oriented fair OTA-FL schemes may still suffer from large aggregation distortion when highly weighted clients experience poor channel conditions. This paper proposes DisC, a game-theoretic distributed client selection framework for fairness-aware, channel-aware, and energy-efficient OTA-FL. Each client selects its participation level by maximizing a utility that captures Pareto fairness importance, learning relevance, OTA distortion, energy consumption, and delay. We show that DisC admits a Nash equilibrium and can be formulated as an exact potential game, where stable equilibria correspond to locally optimal OTA-FL operating points. DisC therefore offers a distributed, incentive-compatible alternative to centralized client selection under wireless and resource constraints. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03024 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-03T18:11:22.762Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).