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Aspire: Practical Batch Queries on Dynamic Encrypted Database with Full Leakage Suppression — arXiv:2610.23057

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23057
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-19T08:46:38.050Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: fd716028d88f3866121b0f52efaf44abf759141e7f9f8c4681ff6ebc9a2f3a50
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fe235c19db41

How to cite

Aspire: Practical Batch Queries on Dynamic Encrypted Database with Full Leakage Suppression — arXiv:2610.23057 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23057 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fe235c19db41 (Metraipolis archive dc_fe235c19db41, sha256 fd716028d88f3866121b0f52efaf44abf759141e7f9f8c4681ff6ebc9a2f3a50)

BibTeX

@misc{dcfe235c19db41,
  title = {Aspire: Practical Batch Queries on Dynamic Encrypted Database with Full Leakage Suppression — arXiv:2610.23057},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23057},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fe235c19db41; sha256 fd716028d88f3866121b0f52efaf44abf759141e7f9f8c4681ff6ebc9a2f3a50},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23057. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Leakage-abuse attacks against encrypted database systems exploit semantic leakage and pose a severe threat to the confidentiality of plaintext data and queries. To address this problem, we propose a zero-leakage encrypted database that rules out leakage-abuse attacks, which fundamentally rely on semantic leakage. We first distinguish between two kinds of zero-leakage security. Ideal zero-leakage forbids the disclosure of any information beyond public parameters, whereas restricted zero-leakage additionally permits the leakage of metadata (such as database size and query timing). We show that restricted zero-leakage is sufficient to thwart leakage-abuse attacks and is achievable in practice. We then formally define adaptive restricted zero-leakage security and present Aspire, an encrypted database that satisfies this notion. Aspire integrates probabilistic batch code and minimal perfect hashing to support efficient batch keyword queries and dynamic updates while revealing only non-semantic metadata. Experimental results demonstrate the practicality and efficiency of Aspire, showing that Aspire can achieve an amortized query latency of less than 1.38 ms (7.53 s for a batch of 5461 keyword queries), with an amortized communication cost of approximately 2.95 KB (16.1 MB in total), on a $2^{22}$ key-value pairs database.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.23057 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T08:41:54.775Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).