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Stability Filters for Receding-Horizon Games — arXiv:2611.02953
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02953
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-03T18:45:42.834Z
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Stability Filters for Receding-Horizon Games — arXiv:2611.02953 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02953 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fcb3c43e80ae (Metraipolis archive dc_fcb3c43e80ae, sha256 f69b85431cd10549994651c31414a2d0189bfaba29ec4e5937cdd5b25692bdef)
BibTeX
@misc{dcfcb3c43e80ae,
title = {Stability Filters for Receding-Horizon Games — arXiv:2611.02953},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02953},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fcb3c43e80ae; sha256 f69b85431cd10549994651c31414a2d0189bfaba29ec4e5937cdd5b25692bdef},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02953. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
In receding-horizon games, self-interested players repeatedly solve a finite-horizon generalized Nash equilibrium problem (GNEP) and apply its first-stage actions. Ensuring stability of the resulting closed-loop system, however, is a challenging task that requires careful design of the players' strategies or additional constraints. We propose a stability filter that minimally modifies the variational equilibrium of the finite-horizon GNEP to enforce a prescribed decrease of a quadratic Lyapunov function. For receding-horizon games with linear dynamics, quadratic costs, and polyhedral coupling input constraints, whose associated GNEP is strongly monotone, we show that a filter always exists such that a closed-loop equilibrium exists, the filter is always feasible, does not intervene when the equilibrium already satisfies the decrease condition, and that renders the closed loop globally exponentially stable. Moreover, the filtered strategy is an $\epsilon$-generalized Nash equilibrium, with $epsilon$ vanishing exponentially along closed-loop trajectories. Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (elenco arXiv math.OC, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Optimization and Control (math.OC). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02953 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-03T18:14:37.793Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/math.OC/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).