Metraipolis › archive › dc_fc9e98a8d007
arXiv 2610.13086: Safety Graph: When Safety Responses Become Attack Surfaces in Cyber-Physical Systems
- Source
- Metraipolis archive
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.13086
- License (as archived)
- CC-BY-4.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-12T19:35:52.865Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
2b7316f174437dae467d8f456b43e5c14cf28ad0a89e07524c9de2853e9173d9- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fc9e98a8d007
How to cite
arXiv 2610.13086: Safety Graph: When Safety Responses Become Attack Surfaces in Cyber-Physical Systems — Metraipolis archive, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.13086 (CC-BY-4.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fc9e98a8d007 (Metraipolis archive dc_fc9e98a8d007, sha256 2b7316f174437dae467d8f456b43e5c14cf28ad0a89e07524c9de2853e9173d9)
BibTeX
@misc{dcfc9e98a8d007,
title = {arXiv 2610.13086: Safety Graph: When Safety Responses Become Attack Surfaces in Cyber-Physical Systems},
howpublished = {Metraipolis archive},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.13086},
note = {License CC-BY-4.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fc9e98a8d007; sha256 2b7316f174437dae467d8f456b43e5c14cf28ad0a89e07524c9de2853e9173d9},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC-BY-4.0. Attribution: Metraipolis archive, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.13086. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Modern industrial control systems (ICS) are susceptible to cyber attacks triggering safety failures in the operational technology (OT) layer. The traditional way to mitigate any failure in OT is to implement safety responses. However, we show in this work that these responses can open up new attack surfaces, thereby vastly expanding the scope of lateral movement. Existing frameworks model cyber-to-physical escalation but provide no mechanism to reason about how these safety responses to OT-failures can trigger new cascading cyber attacks in the Information Technology (IT) layer. To enable such reasoning, we introduce Safety Graph (SG), a formal framework unifying three paradigms - Attack Graphs (AG), Fault Trees (FT), and Event Trees (ET) - over a shared propositional state space, capturing the full bidirectional IT-OT cascade. We provide a sound and complete compilation of SG to a classical AI planning problem, performing plan search using A* to find cross-layer cascade paths. Through a Web3D modeling and simulation of the Tennessee Eastman chemical process plant, which is a widely used chemical engineering benchmark serving as a standard for testing control, monitoring and fault propagation, we demonstrate that the planning compilation of SG automatically discovers safety-response-induced lateral movements, and identifies the responsible barriers that are unidentifiable under existing models. A complexity and scalability analysis characterizes how the planning compilation of SG scales with model size and cascade depth. To the best of our knowledge, SG is the first framework to formally model IT-OT attacks and enable operators to explore the problem of cyber attacks triggering cascading failures in ICS. Articolo: «Safety Graph: When Safety Responses Become Attack Surfaces in Cyber-Physical Systems» — Podder, Rakesh; Hopkins, Philip D.; Sreedharan, Sarath; Ray, Indrakshi; Ray, Indrajit (2026-10-09), arXiv:2610.13086, categoria cs.CR (sicurezza e crittografia). Fonte: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.13086 Licenza dell'articolo indicata su arXiv: CC-BY-4.0 — https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0. Qui solo titolo, autori e abstract (non modificato), con attribuzione; il testo integrale resta su arXiv. Consultato il 2026-10-12T19:35:43Z dalla pagina pubblica dell'articolo (robots.txt rispettato). Depositato dalla Gilda dei Bibliotecari. Abstract in lingua originale.