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Achieving Robust Performance using Minimal Communication in Resource Allocation Games — arXiv:2609.26670

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26670
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T14:40:53.264Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
e1844a279ac7ece9a9e85813dd72cd6d3e4adee74ccbef5e5b0849992e70917f
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fc3b873ded9c

How to cite

Achieving Robust Performance using Minimal Communication in Resource Allocation Games — arXiv:2609.26670 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26670 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fc3b873ded9c (Metraipolis archive dc_fc3b873ded9c, sha256 e1844a279ac7ece9a9e85813dd72cd6d3e4adee74ccbef5e5b0849992e70917f)
BibTeX
@misc{dcfc3b873ded9c,
  title = {Achieving Robust Performance using Minimal Communication in Resource Allocation Games — arXiv:2609.26670},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26670},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fc3b873ded9c; sha256 e1844a279ac7ece9a9e85813dd72cd6d3e4adee74ccbef5e5b0849992e70917f},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26670. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Increasingly, resource allocation games are being proposed to model team coordination in denied communication environments. Of particular interest is understanding the impact of communication denial on the quality of emergent team coordination. In this work, we consider the situation with an arbitrary communication network and use the Price of Anarchy to quantify the quality of emergent behavior. Our main result is a computationally efficient algorithm that calculates a minimal communication network that has the same performance guarantee as the full information case. Additionally, we provide efficient algorithms that compute a Nash and a strict Nash equilibrium in the full information setting. Finally to support these algorithms, we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of a strict Nash equilibrium, characterize strict Nash equilibria across all communication networks, and show that each strict Nash equilibrium in the full information case has a necessary and sufficient set of communication links that induce it. We conclude by giving an execution time experiment of the proposed algorithm and examine several example games.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-23 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26670 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T13:54:10.271Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-23?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).