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Pricing the DeFi Tail: Do Protocols or Depositors Price Operational Risk? — arXiv:2609.00911
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00911
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-17T06:46:49.187Z
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How to cite
Pricing the DeFi Tail: Do Protocols or Depositors Price Operational Risk? — arXiv:2609.00911 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00911 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fbd4a688ac67 (Metraipolis archive dc_fbd4a688ac67, sha256 87b2413c4e87f9fa7826a381884c81f338a22cc2434cf145c2e9421555a698a5)
BibTeX
@misc{dcfbd4a688ac67,
title = {Pricing the DeFi Tail: Do Protocols or Depositors Price Operational Risk? — arXiv:2609.00911},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00911},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fbd4a688ac67; sha256 87b2413c4e87f9fa7826a381884c81f338a22cc2434cf145c2e9421555a698a5},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00911. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Similar to banks, DeFi protocols expose depositors to operational risk (USD 9.45 billion across 1,075 events since 2020). Unlike banks, they are not required to hold capital against it. A protocol may maintain a buffer voluntarily. Absent one, the risk falls on the depositor, who should then demand a risk premium in the supply yield. I quantify the underlying tail on one benchmark, a per-sector Basel loss-distribution approach fitted to a new operational risk event dataset, and test both margins against it. Tails in the four core sectors are no heavier than the Moscadelli banking band $[0.85, 1.39]$. Bridge, Derivatives, and the residual Other sector exhibit cyber-loss-level tails ($\hat\xi \approx 1.6$), with point estimates past the infinite-mean boundary. The Lending tail implies a $\mathrm{VaR}_{99.9}$ capital buffer of 18% of TVL and of the ten largest Lending venues, the four holding a buffer cover on average 5% of it. Under market discipline, depositors should demand a higher yield in compensation where a venue does not maintain a buffer. I find that venues without a buffer pay a higher premium than those with (a 125-bps gap in medians): evidence the market discriminates in the right direction. However, the premium falls far short of an adequately priced tail. This unpriced tail falls disproportionately on the retail depositor, who sees only the posted rate but lacks the information and skills to price it. Because these products are not bank-regulated, I recommend disclosure over capital mandates: protocols, and any service providers that front access to it, should publish standardized losses, existing capital buffers and tail coverage.
Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-02 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Risk Management (q-fin.RM) ; Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.00911 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T06:38:14.383Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-02?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).