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Quantum-Ready Secure WAN: A Risk Assessment and Migration Framework — arXiv:2609.26225

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26225
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T14:42:07.302Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
fbd14b15902f4c3f5b551f839e6469283820216faab3a408e8ea831fd5072bcf
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fb7b5bed81d3

How to cite

Quantum-Ready Secure WAN: A Risk Assessment and Migration Framework — arXiv:2609.26225 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26225 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fb7b5bed81d3 (Metraipolis archive dc_fb7b5bed81d3, sha256 fbd14b15902f4c3f5b551f839e6469283820216faab3a408e8ea831fd5072bcf)
BibTeX
@misc{dcfb7b5bed81d3,
  title = {Quantum-Ready Secure WAN: A Risk Assessment and Migration Framework — arXiv:2609.26225},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26225},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fb7b5bed81d3; sha256 fbd14b15902f4c3f5b551f839e6469283820216faab3a408e8ea831fd5072bcf},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26225. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Enterprise wide-area networks (WANs) use quantum-vulnerable public-key cryptography to authenticate peers and establish keys for Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), Transport Layer Security (TLS), and software-defined WAN services. Harvest-now, decrypt-later collection already threatens data whose protection lifetime may exceed the time needed to migrate, while a future cryptographically relevant quantum computer would also endanger certificates and other authentication dependencies. Post-quantum standards and government directives now define algorithms and transition milestones, but they do not tell an enterprise which WAN services to migrate first or what evidence is sufficient for deployment. This paper proposes a vendor-neutral framework that separates exposure priority, migration readiness, and evidence confidence, and maps those outputs to staged security, operational, and governance gates. It also defines a complete evaluation design for classical and ML-KEM hybrid key establishment in TLS 1.3 and IKEv2/IPsec. The retained artifact is narrower: it contains author-reported aggregate TLS p50, p95, and p99 latencies at configured loss settings of 0%, 1%, 3%, and 5%, an arithmetic checker, and limited environment and MTU/MSS notes. At those settings, the TLS-H minus TLS-C p95 differences are 0.00, 0.16, 0.38, and 0.63 ms, corresponding to 0.00%, 1.32%, 3.07%, and 5.00% relative to TLS-C. These values are descriptive aggregate observations, not inferential results, because per-trial data, sample counts, original captures, and timestamped logs were not retained. Protocol-size and MTU/MSS calculations are reported separately from measured behavior, and unsupported IKE, resource, throughput, retransmission, and downgrade outcomes are excluded.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-23 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26225 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T13:55:11.746Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-23?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).