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Refundable Deposits: How to Restore Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games — arXiv:2608.27536

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.27536
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T10:57:07.097Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
c782625fb1db1379b0ece603cbf3d2376008abfd5d08e17436987a12e73f0a56
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fb725e1730df

How to cite

Refundable Deposits: How to Restore Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games — arXiv:2608.27536 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.27536 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fb725e1730df (Metraipolis archive dc_fb725e1730df, sha256 c782625fb1db1379b0ece603cbf3d2376008abfd5d08e17436987a12e73f0a56)
BibTeX
@misc{dcfb725e1730df,
  title = {Refundable Deposits: How to Restore Cooperation in Finitely Repeated Games — arXiv:2608.27536},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.27536},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fb725e1730df; sha256 c782625fb1db1379b0ece603cbf3d2376008abfd5d08e17436987a12e73f0a56},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.27536. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

While infinitely repeated games admit a rich set of Nash equilibria, finitely repeated games typically have a much smaller and often inefficient one. We show how to enlarge this set using deposits: in each period a player may place a refundable sum with a neutral intermediary, returned when the game ends and forfeited following a deviation. Paying these deposits is voluntary and incentive compatible at every stage, so no commitment by the players is assumed, the only commitment required being that of the intermediary to a refund rule fixed before play begins. The mechanism sustains payoff profiles more efficient than those of the standard equilibria, without altering the underlying game and without transfers between players. We demonstrate it on the prisoner's dilemma, a congestion game, and a public goods game, all settings where cooperation cannot emerge in the standard finitely repeated version. We also apply it to a dynamic common-pool resource, suggesting that the construction extends beyond repeated stage-games.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-31 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.27536 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T10:48:51.056Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-08-31?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).