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A Feature-Rich Embedded NIDS with eBPF/XDP: Detector and Architecture Trade-offs — arXiv:2609.12605

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12605
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T03:08:41.751Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
e2468d8c9d3fd5a7105312038722aa5c336aa4b0f58b70a095bde948ddce63bf
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fa1efc7526f5

How to cite

A Feature-Rich Embedded NIDS with eBPF/XDP: Detector and Architecture Trade-offs — arXiv:2609.12605 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12605 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fa1efc7526f5 (Metraipolis archive dc_fa1efc7526f5, sha256 e2468d8c9d3fd5a7105312038722aa5c336aa4b0f58b70a095bde948ddce63bf)
BibTeX
@misc{dcfa1efc7526f5,
  title = {A Feature-Rich Embedded NIDS with eBPF/XDP: Detector and Architecture Trade-offs — arXiv:2609.12605},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12605},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_fa1efc7526f5; sha256 e2468d8c9d3fd5a7105312038722aa5c336aa4b0f58b70a095bde948ddce63bf},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12605. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks remain a serious threat to transport networks, with recent attack volumes exceeding 30 Tbps, and the telecommunications industry being the main target. Recent work has yet to study the impact of the hosting software architecture on network monitoring solutions, or to assess recent algorithms for improving attack detection. This paper presents a Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) for DDoS detection in transport networks, developed in collaboration with Ericsson. Building on a statistical baseline, we improve detection effectiveness with an Isolation Forest trained on a wider set of flow features, extracted by GoFlowMeter, our open-source Go implementation of CICFlowMeter, and we integrate eBPF/XDP so that the NIDS filters real traffic at the kernel level. We further compare three deployments, monolithic, Kafka-based, and gRPC-based microservices, on a Raspberry Pi 5 testbed replaying the CIC-DDoS2019 dataset as real network traffic. Detection quality is governed mainly by the choice of detector rather than by the transport: the Isolation Forest raises recall and F1 score (0.965 live in the monolithic variant) over the baseline by flagging low-volume attack windows that the baseline misses. The transport is not neutral, however: gRPC reaches almost the same accuracy as the monolithic variant while adding less than 2 milliseconds of transport time per window, whereas the asynchronous Kafka pipeline trails by roughly nine percentage points and adds about 27 milliseconds. These findings clarify the trade-off between detection quality and architectural overhead when deploying a NIDS on resource-constrained hardware.

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-14 in cs.DC).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC); Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12605 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T03:03:05.106Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.DC/2026-09-14?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).