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Rational Learning One Step Off the Path — arXiv:2608.05380

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.05380
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-31T11:09:12.941Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: d987fbcc685caad4e7c543ae23c3e739e535eff674ae78c7f5c2120a66dd4cd5
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f95340ceaaa0

How to cite

Rational Learning One Step Off the Path — arXiv:2608.05380 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.05380 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f95340ceaaa0 (Metraipolis archive dc_f95340ceaaa0, sha256 d987fbcc685caad4e7c543ae23c3e739e535eff674ae78c7f5c2120a66dd4cd5)

BibTeX

@misc{dcf95340ceaaa0,
  title = {Rational Learning One Step Off the Path — arXiv:2608.05380},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.05380},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f95340ceaaa0; sha256 d987fbcc685caad4e7c543ae23c3e739e535eff674ae78c7f5c2120a66dd4cd5},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.05380. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study how endogenous learning shapes beliefs and strategies in extensive-form games. We adopt the overlapping-generations model of \citet{FL1993}, in which finitely lived Bayesian agents are randomly matched, observe only the outcomes of their own matches, and choose dynamically optimal strategies. We study limiting strategy profiles in steady states as agents become arbitrarily long lived and patient. We show that learning disciplines beliefs and strategies in subgames reached after a single deviation from the path of play. In particular, we establish the converse of \citet{FL2006}, showing that such limiting strategy profiles must be path-equivalent to subgame-confirmed equilibria.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-07 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.05380 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-31T10:58:32.926Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-08-07?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).