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Mean field game model for human capital accumulation under budget constraints — arXiv:2608.24417

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24417
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-18T06:46:20.909Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
047d4e972046aa0cbb39c4469d9d5b8ba40941cc2489f44c9518febc04dc3e90
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f80fa2099fd2

How to cite

Mean field game model for human capital accumulation under budget constraints — arXiv:2608.24417 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24417 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f80fa2099fd2 (Metraipolis archive dc_f80fa2099fd2, sha256 047d4e972046aa0cbb39c4469d9d5b8ba40941cc2489f44c9518febc04dc3e90)
BibTeX
@misc{dcf80fa2099fd2,
  title = {Mean field game model for human capital accumulation under budget constraints — arXiv:2608.24417},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24417},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f80fa2099fd2; sha256 047d4e972046aa0cbb39c4469d9d5b8ba40941cc2489f44c9518febc04dc3e90},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24417. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study a deterministic first-order mean field game model for human capital accumulation in which a continuum of agents invest in education and training to reach a certain qualification level in minimum time. The productivity of learning depends on both the individual's current level of human capital and the distribution of the population, modeling knowledge spillovers and social interactions. Learning is financed by the income generated by existing human capital, leading to a state constraint requiring the financial resources to remain nonnegative throughout the evolution. For a fixed population flow, we formulate the individual problem as a state-constrained minimum-time optimal control problem with time-dependent dynamics. We establish the existence of optimal controls and trajectories, analyze the associated value function through the Dynamic Programming Principle and a Hamilton--Jacobi equation, and characterize the optimal learning effort under suitable regularity and convexity assumptions. The optimal feedback induces a continuity equation describing the evolution of the population distribution. The resulting mean field game is formulated as a fixed-point problem for the population flow. By constructing a compact invariant set and applying Schauder's fixed-point theorem, we prove the existence of at least one equilibrium on every finite population horizon, while the individual minimum-time problem remains formulated on the infinite time horizon.

Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-26 in math.OC).
Categorie arXiv: Optimization and Control (math.OC).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24417 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T06:39:24.031Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/math.OC/2026-08-26?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).