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Side-Channel Attack Prevention for Post Quantum Cryptography Algorithms: A 3D-Shield Approach — arXiv:2611.01144
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01144
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-03T11:17:08.819Z
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Side-Channel Attack Prevention for Post Quantum Cryptography Algorithms: A 3D-Shield Approach — arXiv:2611.01144 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01144 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f74a6f3979de (Metraipolis archive dc_f74a6f3979de, sha256 a3ad876ebf9ef444b5fb8e8673347eeca963ae6a76b7f9f46729d55ea84e08ff)
BibTeX
@misc{dcf74a6f3979de,
title = {Side-Channel Attack Prevention for Post Quantum Cryptography Algorithms: A 3D-Shield Approach — arXiv:2611.01144},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01144},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f74a6f3979de; sha256 a3ad876ebf9ef444b5fb8e8673347eeca963ae6a76b7f9f46729d55ea84e08ff},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01144. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Despite their theoretical quantum attack resistance, practical implementations of post-quantum cryptography (PQC) algorithms remain susceptible to side-channel attacks. This includes all standard algorithms selected the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) such as Kyber/ML-KEM, Dilithium/ML-DSA, Falcon/FN-DSA and SPHINCS+/SLH-DSA. This paper proposes an alternative defense for side-channel resilience based on 3D integration that uses 3D hardware to shield the underlying cryptographic activity by introducing decoy keys and physical shielding through stacking. The proposed approach can complement other security measures (such as masking and shuffling) on protecting Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) that move computation to dedicated NTT chips. We outline the construction of our approach and validate the effectiveness on a generic attack targeting intermediate computation inside an NTT butterfly. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Emerging Technologies (cs.ET). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01144 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-03T11:02:07.198Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).