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Testing and Evaluation of Agentic AI Systems In Military Command and Control — arXiv:2608.20597

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20597
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-18T10:34:24.793Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
92745ef433391562a02bb78a88259da022fac464a3ef219850dd246e89b2a4f1
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f6d7de7efa60

How to cite

Testing and Evaluation of Agentic AI Systems In Military Command and Control — arXiv:2608.20597 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20597 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f6d7de7efa60 (Metraipolis archive dc_f6d7de7efa60, sha256 92745ef433391562a02bb78a88259da022fac464a3ef219850dd246e89b2a4f1)
BibTeX
@misc{dcf6d7de7efa60,
  title = {Testing and Evaluation of Agentic AI Systems In Military Command and Control — arXiv:2608.20597},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20597},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f6d7de7efa60; sha256 92745ef433391562a02bb78a88259da022fac464a3ef219850dd246e89b2a4f1},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20597. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Agentic AI systems are being procured for military command and control (C2) under public commitments to rigorous testing and human oversight. Whether such commitments can be discharged depends on their supporting assurance case, which requires three elements: claims specifying the conditions for acceptability, evidence bearing on those claims, and an argument connecting the two. Through a structured review of 240 documented Testing and Evaluation (T&E) practices, spanning eight evaluation dimensions and three lifecycle stages, we identify eight assumptions that established methods make about their test article, grouped into four clusters: system specifiability, stability, composability, and supervisability. Agentic properties weaken all eight assumptions. This erosion affects the argument connecting evidence to claims, not the claims or evidence themselves. As a result, test results may satisfy process requirements, but they do not warrant the inference from tested to fielded behavior. We derive ten assurance claims for the first three assumption clusters and assess whether current and emerging methods can address each, mapping operational consequences through five C2 scenarios. Supervisability is identified but not assessed here, since evidencing it depends on system stability results and human factors T&E methods beyond the present scope. The documented record does not support broad claims about system-level behavior, but narrower claims remain recoverable in principle, contingent on mature methods: bounded mission envelopes, trajectory-grounded correctness, executable runtime constraints, and characterized run-to-run variance. Part of the evidentiary burden shifts into deployment, making the determination to field a continuing act. Where evidence cannot be generated, the residual uncertainty can be governed through defined expiry conditions and assigned ownership.

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-24 in cs.SE).
Categorie arXiv: Software Engineering (cs.SE) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Computers and Society (cs.CY).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20597 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T10:28:20.978Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.SE/2026-08-24?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).