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A Solution to the Roommate Problem — arXiv:2608.11682

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11682
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T06:06:14.938Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
f91285e96b63402402a793a923a43f3e00cd082db91910cbbfff6c4f7168bcb4
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f655fe06ec5e

How to cite

A Solution to the Roommate Problem — arXiv:2608.11682 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11682 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f655fe06ec5e (Metraipolis archive dc_f655fe06ec5e, sha256 f91285e96b63402402a793a923a43f3e00cd082db91910cbbfff6c4f7168bcb4)
BibTeX
@misc{dcf655fe06ec5e,
  title = {A Solution to the Roommate Problem — arXiv:2608.11682},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11682},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f655fe06ec5e; sha256 f91285e96b63402402a793a923a43f3e00cd082db91910cbbfff6c4f7168bcb4},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11682. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We extend the concept of priority-neutral matching, introduced by Reny (2022) in the school choice context, to the roommate problem. We prove three main results. First, a blocking-neutral matching always exists in constrained roommate problems under arbitrary feasibility constraints (Theorem 1). Second, the set of stable matchings is contained in the set of blocking-neutral matchings, which in turn is contained in the set of Pareto-optimal matchings (Theorem 2). Third, whenever stable matchings exist, the set of blocking-neutral matchings coincides with the set of stable matchings (Theorem 3). We also show that existence fails under weak preferences and extend the concept to two-sided school choice.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-13 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.11682 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T05:55:52.867Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-08-13?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).