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Rethinking Neural Decompilation: Candidate Selection as the Hidden Bottleneck — arXiv:2611.02788

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02788
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T10:37:57.349Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
e64efff66e1d3d1ddadbd8cdf3abe980398113c4dcecc7c01090b8df9bd275e1
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f64249c62875

How to cite

Rethinking Neural Decompilation: Candidate Selection as the Hidden Bottleneck — arXiv:2611.02788 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02788 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f64249c62875 (Metraipolis archive dc_f64249c62875, sha256 e64efff66e1d3d1ddadbd8cdf3abe980398113c4dcecc7c01090b8df9bd275e1)
BibTeX
@misc{dcf64249c62875,
  title = {Rethinking Neural Decompilation: Candidate Selection as the Hidden Bottleneck — arXiv:2611.02788},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02788},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f64249c62875; sha256 e64efff66e1d3d1ddadbd8cdf3abe980398113c4dcecc7c01090b8df9bd275e1},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02788. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Reverse engineering obfuscated binaries is a core task in malware analysis and software security auditing. While neural decompilers based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have improved the readability and functional fidelity of recovered code over heuristic tools such as Ghidra and IDA Pro, a substantial gap remains between best-sample performance and practical single-output accuracy, particularly under code obfuscation. We study this gap through the lens of candidate generation and candidate selection. Using the LLM4Decompile architecture, we show that ground-truth tokens lie within the model's top-five next-token predictions in 95.6% of positions on average and that multi-sample decoding reaches a pass@100 of 93% on HumanEval-Decompile, indicating that correct reconstructions are typically already present in the model's sampling space. We then evaluate a generate-then-select pipeline that ranks 100 candidates per input with text-, syntax-, embedding-, consensus-, and likelihood-based selectors. Negative perplexity emerges as the strongest static selector on HumanEval-Decompile (73.3% pass@1), while execution-guided selection nearly closes the oracle gap on ExeBench (86.3% pass@1). Combined with one epoch of fine-tuning on our newly released ExeBench-Obfuscated dataset containing 362,647 obfuscated OLLVM samples, the same pipeline increases the pass@1 rate for obfuscated binaries to 88.8%, directly contradicting prior claims that released LLM4Decompile checkpoints are unsuitable for obfuscated inputs.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.AI, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02788 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T10:29:48.901Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.AI/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).