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STV Audit Graphs: A Visual Tool to Measure Election Stability — arXiv:2609.10887

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10887
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-16T05:45:10.875Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: 641f9b1fc6840146eb1b20db2015abef15acf51d7f4328f861b51da324397cee
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f5ea72ea702e

How to cite

STV Audit Graphs: A Visual Tool to Measure Election Stability — arXiv:2609.10887 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10887 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f5ea72ea702e (Metraipolis archive dc_f5ea72ea702e, sha256 641f9b1fc6840146eb1b20db2015abef15acf51d7f4328f861b51da324397cee)

BibTeX

@misc{dcf5ea72ea702e,
  title = {STV Audit Graphs: A Visual Tool to Measure Election Stability — arXiv:2609.10887},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10887},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f5ea72ea702e; sha256 641f9b1fc6840146eb1b20db2015abef15acf51d7f4328f861b51da324397cee},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10887. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

The Single Transferable Vote (STV) is an algorithmic election rule. Round by round, a profile of ranked-choice ballots is reinterpreted to determine which decision to make next, and candidates are seated or eliminated until a full winner set emerges. This algorithmic nature makes STV theoretically more brittle than other election rules: uncertainty about an early round of the election might percolate irreversibly into the rest. For this reason, a generalized non-trivial Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA) framework has remained elusive for STV. Such a framework must concoct a set of null hypotheses, or assertions, whose rejection would bound the probability that the outcome of the election was incorrectly reported. We present audit graphs as a solution to design the assertions needed for RLAs of arbitrary STV elections, as well as quantitatively describe the uncertainty (or lack thereof) of their outcomes. These audit graphs explore election paths that are ``close'' to the recorded one by considering the alternative decisions the STV algorithm might have made if a small number of ballots were perturbed.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-11 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Applications (stat.AP).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10887 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T05:29:38.354Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).