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OT-PCA: New Key-Recovery Plaintext-Checking Oracle Based Side-Channel Attacks on HQC with Offline Templates — arXiv:2609.35205
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35205
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-07T22:34:53.341Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
ebfd1e05b9a8e52b3d55fc898965195fc7514ae13f313b73ced2b5ddf6802865- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
OT-PCA: New Key-Recovery Plaintext-Checking Oracle Based Side-Channel Attacks on HQC with Offline Templates — arXiv:2609.35205 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35205 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f56dbe67f518 (Metraipolis archive dc_f56dbe67f518, sha256 ebfd1e05b9a8e52b3d55fc898965195fc7514ae13f313b73ced2b5ddf6802865)
BibTeX
@misc{dcf56dbe67f518,
title = {OT-PCA: New Key-Recovery Plaintext-Checking Oracle Based Side-Channel Attacks on HQC with Offline Templates — arXiv:2609.35205},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35205},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f56dbe67f518; sha256 ebfd1e05b9a8e52b3d55fc898965195fc7514ae13f313b73ced2b5ddf6802865},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35205. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
In this paper, we introduce OT-PCA, a novel approach for conducting Plaintext-Checking (PC) oracle based side-channel attacks, specifically designed for Hamming Quasi-Cyclic (HQC). By calling the publicly accessible HQC decoder, we build offline templates that enable efficient extraction of soft information for hundreds of secret positions with just a single PC oracle call. Our method addresses critical challenges in optimizing key-related information extraction, including maximizing decryption output entropy and ensuring error pattern independence, through the use of genetic-style algorithms. Extensive simulations demonstrate that our new attack method significantly reduces the required number of oracle calls, achieving a 2.4-fold decrease for hqc-128 and even greater reductions for hqc-192 and hqc-256 compared to current state-of-the-art methods. Notably, the attack shows strong resilience against inaccuracy in the PC oracle-when the oracle accuracy decreases to 95%, the reduction factor in oracle call requirements increases to 7.6 for hqc-128. Lastly, a real-world evaluation conducted using power analysis on a platform with an ARM Cortex-M4 microcontroller validates the practical applicability and effectiveness of our approach. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-29 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35205 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-07T22:13:03.736Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-29?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).