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An Improved Upper Bound for the Random-Offerer Mechanism in Bilateral Trade via Recursive Hard Instances — arXiv:2610.06547

Source
arXiv
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06547
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-06T05:29:27.546Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
f0b40d191d4ea1ea596272e2656d21e91e3f619680da3fad1b3caa401e6fdcfe
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How to cite

An Improved Upper Bound for the Random-Offerer Mechanism in Bilateral Trade via Recursive Hard Instances — arXiv:2610.06547 — arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06547 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f459aad4f82b (Metraipolis archive dc_f459aad4f82b, sha256 f0b40d191d4ea1ea596272e2656d21e91e3f619680da3fad1b3caa401e6fdcfe)
BibTeX
@misc{dcf459aad4f82b,
  title = {An Improved Upper Bound for the Random-Offerer Mechanism in Bilateral Trade via Recursive Hard Instances — arXiv:2610.06547},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06547},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f459aad4f82b; sha256 f0b40d191d4ea1ea596272e2656d21e91e3f619680da3fad1b3caa401e6fdcfe},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06547. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study the worst-case efficiency of the random-offerer mechanism in bilateral trade relative to the first-best gains from trade. We construct a family of independent buyer value and seller cost distributions whose ratio converges to $0.436943488\ldots$, improving the previous upper bound of $0.460242308\ldots$. Our construction combines recursively nested seller distributions with downward transport of buyer values. The recursive structure allows contributions from different scales to accumulate, leading to stronger hard instances. We analyze this construction through a recurrence and obtain an analytic characterization of the limiting constant.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.06547 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-06T05:25:35.320Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).