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Building the Truman Show: A TrustZone-Based Framework for Lightweight Out-of-band Kernel Security Monitoring — arXiv:2608.29758

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29758
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T08:25:41.961Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
8b827bbeb7da17b7177af5030ebad5101b1c6379c9d7887f363de3815720380d
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f4377fe884e7

How to cite

Building the Truman Show: A TrustZone-Based Framework for Lightweight Out-of-band Kernel Security Monitoring — arXiv:2608.29758 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29758 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f4377fe884e7 (Metraipolis archive dc_f4377fe884e7, sha256 8b827bbeb7da17b7177af5030ebad5101b1c6379c9d7887f363de3815720380d)
BibTeX
@misc{dcf4377fe884e7,
  title = {Building the Truman Show: A TrustZone-Based Framework for Lightweight Out-of-band Kernel Security Monitoring — arXiv:2608.29758},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29758},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f4377fe884e7; sha256 8b827bbeb7da17b7177af5030ebad5101b1c6379c9d7887f363de3815720380d},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29758. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

The increasing number of vulnerabilities in operating systems, together with sophisticated kernel-level threats (e.g., rootkits), has weakened the effectiveness of traditional in-kernel protection mechanisms. Since these defenses operate at the same privilege level as the kernel, they share the same attack surface and can be bypassed once the kernel is compromised. Isolation-based security approaches provide stronger protection by separating security logic from the kernel, but strict isolation often introduces semantic gaps that limit system visibility and hinder timely threat detection. In this paper, we present LOOM, a lightweight out-of-band operating system monitoring architecture built on ARM TrustZone. By leveraging TrustZone's hardware-enforced isolation, LOOM establishes a tamper-resistant monitoring environment independent of the kernel. To bridge the semantic gap, we design a lightweight semantic reconstruction mechanism in the Secure World. It selectively captures the states and behavioral patterns of critical kernel objects, such as process control blocks and kernel modules. Additionally, LOOM introduces a dual-stage hazard prevention mechanism that combines atomic memory protection with an interrupt-driven adaptive agent to detect and mitigate kernel rootkit activities. An address translation cache is further incorporated to optimize repeated address access and reduce monitoring overhead. Overall, we develop a multi-layered collaborative architecture with platform, functional, and auxiliary layers for secure and efficient kernel monitoring. A prototype of LOOM has been implemented on the Phytium D2000 platform. Experimental results indicate that LOOM incurs negligible overhead while maintaining a strong monitoring capability. Furthermore, a security capability analysis based on CVE cases demonstrates that LOOM can detect and mitigate various kernel attacks.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-01 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Software Engineering (cs.SE).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29758 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T08:10:59.873Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-01?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).