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Auctioning Attention on Social Networks — arXiv:2608.06665

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06665
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T09:50:08.468Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
f8912100e7aff4169b82f5883370dc363374b0f39291a04d9f43a29cbeb47e14
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f41610bf4bf1

How to cite

Auctioning Attention on Social Networks — arXiv:2608.06665 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06665 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f41610bf4bf1 (Metraipolis archive dc_f41610bf4bf1, sha256 f8912100e7aff4169b82f5883370dc363374b0f39291a04d9f43a29cbeb47e14)
BibTeX
@misc{dcf41610bf4bf1,
  title = {Auctioning Attention on Social Networks — arXiv:2608.06665},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06665},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f41610bf4bf1; sha256 f8912100e7aff4169b82f5883370dc363374b0f39291a04d9f43a29cbeb47e14},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06665. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Social media recommendation systems create conflict: content producers, content consumers, platform operators, and social pressures struggle to direct the allocation of attention in their favor while also facing competing societal pressures. Producers may feel pressure to optimize for recommendation algorithms and consumers may be exposed to content with negative externalities such as polarization and misinformation. Platforms aim to maximize user engagement, oftentimes resulting in over consumption from consumers. There is mounting pressure from policymakers and broader society to address these issues. Prior methods for constructing social media feeds have focused on recommendation systems. Instead, we propose a, to our knowledge, novel auction based method for feed construction where users bid for the attention of other users. Our mechanism systematically considers producers, consumers, platform operators, and social welfare. We show that our auction is weakly incentive compatible under budget constraints. To balance between producer and consumer welfare, we introduce a tax policy to the auction to increase the cost of content with negative externalities. Simulations over common social network topologies and an empirically observed network show how different feed algorithms prioritize different stakeholders. Our proposed auction based mechanisms produce on average 36.3% higher producer welfare than comparison algorithms on the empirically observed network and 31.4% higher producer welfare than comparison algorithms on the synthetic networks. Our methods also produce more equitable distributions of attention than baseline methods across all evaluated network types. Our proposed mechanism addresses attention allocation at a systematic level, balancing between the needs of different stakeholders.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-10 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06665 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T09:49:04.939Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-08-10?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).