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Persuasion by Parts — arXiv:2611.02845

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02845
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T11:15:29.494Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
2475ae7d026c79ccd526fc60406ac50db0f0bf31efefe4a777ffc7c333bfd7cd
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f400f75a71d4

How to cite

Persuasion by Parts — arXiv:2611.02845 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02845 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f400f75a71d4 (Metraipolis archive dc_f400f75a71d4, sha256 2475ae7d026c79ccd526fc60406ac50db0f0bf31efefe4a777ffc7c333bfd7cd)
BibTeX
@misc{dcf400f75a71d4,
  title = {Persuasion by Parts — arXiv:2611.02845},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02845},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f400f75a71d4; sha256 2475ae7d026c79ccd526fc60406ac50db0f0bf31efefe4a777ffc7c333bfd7cd},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02845. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Classical Bayesian persuasion assumes that an information designer can condition signals on the entire state. We propose persuasion by parts. In this model, the receiver's payoff from acting is $X = \sum_{i=1}^n X_i$ for independent coordinates $X_1,\ldots,X_n$ observed by separate sources. The designer commits in advance to a product experiment, in which each source $i$ can condition its signal only on $X_i$. Given the signals, the receiver computes her posterior mean $y$ of $X$ and acts with probability $g(y)$, where $g\colon \mathbb{R} \to [0,1]$ is a nondecreasing function. The designer aims to maximize the probability of action. Let $V_{\mathrm{prod}}(g)$ and $V_{\mathrm{joint}}(g)$ be the supremum probabilities of action under persuasion by parts and under joint persuasion, respectively. When the designer knows $g$, we show $$ V_{\mathrm{prod}}(g) \;\ge\; c\,V_{\mathrm{joint}}(g)^2 \qquad\text{for every nondecreasing } g\colon \mathbb{R} \to [0,1], $$ where $c > 0$ is an absolute constant independent of $n$ and the prior; the exponent $2$ is tight. When $g$ is unknown, we construct a product experiment $\Pi$ from the prior alone, whose probability of action $V_\Pi(g)$ satisfies $$ V_\Pi(g) \;\ge\; c_\varepsilon\,V_{\mathrm{joint}}(g)^{2 + \varepsilon} \qquad\text{for every } \varepsilon > 0 \text{ and every nondecreasing } g\colon \mathbb{R} \to [0,1], $$ where $c_\varepsilon > 0$ depends only on $\varepsilon$.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02845 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T11:01:07.156Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).