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Sustained Participation as a Security Resource: The Bounded Participation Channel — arXiv:2609.35300
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35300
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-07T22:34:55.431Z
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Sustained Participation as a Security Resource: The Bounded Participation Channel — arXiv:2609.35300 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35300 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f3ec3eb101b1 (Metraipolis archive dc_f3ec3eb101b1, sha256 8e9a56e8b18fc4a1a92c7c160639b421278ac7d485715140ced2e7566abded05)
BibTeX
@misc{dcf3ec3eb101b1,
title = {Sustained Participation as a Security Resource: The Bounded Participation Channel — arXiv:2609.35300},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35300},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f3ec3eb101b1; sha256 8e9a56e8b18fc4a1a92c7c160639b421278ac7d485715140ced2e7566abded05},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35300. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Can sustained, per-identity participation be engineered into a security resource? Most anti-Sybil defenses price identity creation rather than identity survival. Once admitted, an adversary may sustain many identities without paying a recurring cost. We introduce the Bounded Participation Channel (BPC), a formal primitive for repeatedly verifying participation window by window. BPC issues fresh, identity-bound challenges under a strict deadline and enforces four structural properties: identity binding, freshness, real-time response, and bounded per-channel throughput. Together, these yield a provable cost theorem: sustaining $s$ identities over $T$ windows requires $C(s,T) \geq sT/\tau_h$ participation channel-windows. The guarantee is solver-agnostic: a channel may be operated by a human, an AI system, or a hybrid. We give a hash-based construction with publicly verifiable participation proofs, characterize four admissible challenge families, and evaluate two against GPT-4o, Gemini 2.5 Flash, and Claude Sonnet 4.5 across 600 trials. Despite near-perfect accuracy (97--100%) on the perceptual tasks, the evaluated automated channels remain throughput-bounded under the tested deployment conditions. The results illustrate a key distinction: solvability does not imply unlimited throughput. By requiring participation to be re-earned by every identity in every time window, BPC turns sustained participation into a measurable security resource with a linear structural cost floor, independent of whether the participation is supplied by humans, AI systems, or hybrids. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-29 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.35300 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-07T22:13:03.743Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-29?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).