Metraipolis › archive › dc_f35141ac11ea
Multiplicity and Uniqueness of Stationary Expected Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining — arXiv:2611.00542
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00542
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-03T11:53:28.373Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
77362d2836dc651fbd334d7d4307d3d3eed3bfd49709db72ba6b759789d76f70- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f35141ac11ea
How to cite
Multiplicity and Uniqueness of Stationary Expected Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining — arXiv:2611.00542 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00542 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f35141ac11ea (Metraipolis archive dc_f35141ac11ea, sha256 77362d2836dc651fbd334d7d4307d3d3eed3bfd49709db72ba6b759789d76f70)
BibTeX
@misc{dcf35141ac11ea,
title = {Multiplicity and Uniqueness of Stationary Expected Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining — arXiv:2611.00542},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00542},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f35141ac11ea; sha256 77362d2836dc651fbd334d7d4307d3d3eed3bfd49709db72ba6b759789d76f70},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00542. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
I study uniqueness of stationary expected payoffs in random-proposer coalitional bargaining with transferable utility. Proposer independence of coalition surplus does not guarantee uniqueness, even when the surplus is strictly monotone and every equilibrium features immediate agreement. For $M^\natural$-concave characteristic functions, including non-monotone ones, I show that stationary expected payoffs are unique and continuous in the primitives, provided that every equilibrium features immediate agreement. To prove uniqueness, I identify an equitable grouping property of maximizing coalitions and show that $M^\natural$-concavity implies it at every no-delay candidate payoff vector. Using equitable grouping, I show that every no-delay equilibrium payoff vector is isolated and has positive local index. For parameter changes that preserve immediate agreement in every equilibrium, a uniform increase in a player's contribution to every coalition containing her strictly increases her expected payoff, while an increase in her discount factor weakly increases it. I apply these results to joint ventures with coordination costs and government formation with ministerial expertise. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.00542 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-03T11:15:07.649Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).