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STAKE: Preventing a colluding majority from double spending — arXiv:2610.01169
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01169
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-06T14:08:14.315Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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How to cite
STAKE: Preventing a colluding majority from double spending — arXiv:2610.01169 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01169 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f2e07298058d (Metraipolis archive dc_f2e07298058d, sha256 ff213aaa4b4d1706ef253c16ce4717c24c38f9746f54e4c76456e398b394ac72)
BibTeX
@misc{dcf2e07298058d,
title = {STAKE: Preventing a colluding majority from double spending — arXiv:2610.01169},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01169},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f2e07298058d; sha256 ff213aaa4b4d1706ef253c16ce4717c24c38f9746f54e4c76456e398b394ac72},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01169. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Blockchains typically operate in open networks where it is hard to control the delay of messages. While classic blockchain protocols assumed synchrony, newer protocols try to remain secure despite unexpected network delays. Unfortunately, in the traditional model where $n$ participants can either be honest or Byzantine, we need a supermajority, or $\lfloor 2n/3\rfloor + 1$, of them to be honest. Recent work have explored the question of reducing the number of needed honest nodes in a game theory model to a majority sometimes by introducing $k$ rational players and $t$ Byzantine players. Yet, to our knowledge, no blockchain protocol managed to reduce it further. In this paper, we offer a blockchain protocol called Secure and Tolerant Algorithm through ($k,t$)-robust Equilibrium (STAKE) that works with only $\lfloor n/3\rfloor + 1$ honest players. STAKE requires each consensus participant to stake a sufficiently large amount $s$ compared to their liquidity $\ell$. We show that the probability that a coalition manages to execute $\zeta$ double spending attacks (we call them a $\zeta$-uple attack) drops polynomially fast with $\zeta$. This allows us to demonstrate that STAKE reaches a ($k,t$)-robust equilibrium, or that rational players do not collude with Byzantine, even with a relatively low $s/\ell$ ratio. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-10-02 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.01169 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-06T12:27:12.834Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-10-02?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).