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BEACON: Behavior-Anchored Cross-Source Knowledge Graph Construction for Cyber Threat Intelligence — arXiv:2608.28394

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.28394
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T10:56:46.886Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
97149625aa4b8ce0fe05b7c40d408b52df51c42376fc33dd03db72755126e9e2
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f2b1de5780fd

How to cite

BEACON: Behavior-Anchored Cross-Source Knowledge Graph Construction for Cyber Threat Intelligence — arXiv:2608.28394 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.28394 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f2b1de5780fd (Metraipolis archive dc_f2b1de5780fd, sha256 97149625aa4b8ce0fe05b7c40d408b52df51c42376fc33dd03db72755126e9e2)
BibTeX
@misc{dcf2b1de5780fd,
  title = {BEACON: Behavior-Anchored Cross-Source Knowledge Graph Construction for Cyber Threat Intelligence — arXiv:2608.28394},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.28394},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f2b1de5780fd; sha256 97149625aa4b8ce0fe05b7c40d408b52df51c42376fc33dd03db72755126e9e2},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.28394. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is foundational to modern cyber defense, yet much of it resides in unstructured reports whose volume and heterogeneity far exceed manual analysis, motivating research on automatically constructing knowledge graphs from CTI reports. However, existing approaches mainly extract partial information within a single report, leaving the cross-source setting unexplored, where the same threat is given unrelated names. Our key insight is that attack behaviors, once mapped to MITRE ATT&CK (a standardized catalog of attack techniques), can anchor the rest of a report. Attack behaviors are the adversarial actions a report describes, while contextual entities (e.g., threat actors, campaigns, and affected products) and Indicators of Compromise (IoCs; e.g., IP addresses) are their participants and traces. Attaching them to these anchors places every per-report graph in one canonical space. We realize this insight in BEACON, an LLM-driven framework for cross-source CTI knowledge graph construction. Its first stage extracts each report into a graph under a propose-then-verify paradigm, grounding candidates in report evidence and official ATT&CK definitions, to suppress LLM misclassification and hallucination. Its second stage merges these graphs with a hierarchical alignment strategy that applies signals in decreasing order of determinism, from character-level and semantic similarity to overlapping technique neighborhoods, iterating as merges pool neighborhoods. No existing benchmark links entities to technique anchors or provides cross-source alignment ground truth. We therefore construct and release two human-annotated datasets from 34 sources: to our knowledge the largest for report-level CTI extraction (8,395 elements) and the first for cross-source consolidation (3,487). On them, BEACON outperforms all baselines by at least 23% and 9%, respectively.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-31 in cs.CL).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Computation and Language (cs.CL).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.28394 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T10:47:33.171Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CL/2026-08-31?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).