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Authorization Propagation in Agent2Agent Systems: An Experimental Security Evaluation of Multi-Hop Delegation — arXiv:2611.07050

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07050
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-06T14:41:21.497Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
c7770aa0b6be7f2eba0ef2de61dce8de525d696b91d70570aac60598a7e68b9b
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f27a558168eb

How to cite

Authorization Propagation in Agent2Agent Systems: An Experimental Security Evaluation of Multi-Hop Delegation — arXiv:2611.07050 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07050 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f27a558168eb (Metraipolis archive dc_f27a558168eb, sha256 c7770aa0b6be7f2eba0ef2de61dce8de525d696b91d70570aac60598a7e68b9b)
BibTeX
@misc{dcf27a558168eb,
  title = {Authorization Propagation in Agent2Agent Systems: An Experimental Security Evaluation of Multi-Hop Delegation — arXiv:2611.07050},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07050},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_f27a558168eb; sha256 c7770aa0b6be7f2eba0ef2de61dce8de525d696b91d70570aac60598a7e68b9b},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07050. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Delegated Agent2Agent (A2A) workflows create a security problem when the agent sending a request is different from the principal from which the authority originated. This paper evaluates a layered downstream-verification design in a synthetic four-party healthcare reimbursement workflow. The prototype separates current-caller context, transitive authorization evidence, per-hop Ed25519 request authentication, and independent replay state for requests and authorization artifacts. Of 15 adversarial conditions, 14 are rejected; an isolated delegation-path test exposes the absence of semantic authority attenuation. A separate authorized-intermediary experiment shows that a holder of the shared authorization-evidence HMAC key can modify the represented authority and generate valid evidence. In the fixed-depth local benchmark, the full configuration has a median security-processing latency of 5.11 ms and a 3.87 kB serialized payload. The results show the value of separating request authentication from inherited authority while identifying origin-verifiable delegation and semantic attenuation as requirements for stronger A2A authorization propagation.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.MA, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Multiagent Systems (cs.MA).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07050 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-06T14:18:27.663Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.MA/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).