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Strategic Heterogeneity: Welfare Gains from Secession and Immigration — arXiv:2608.06092
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06092
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-31T11:09:12.950Z
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Strategic Heterogeneity: Welfare Gains from Secession and Immigration — arXiv:2608.06092 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06092 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_efd7c5cee57a (Metraipolis archive dc_efd7c5cee57a, sha256 20c26d4752e36f6cb08d1c96c1d3dac5e2eca05de9b2ccd9d12f713d3fa7e934)
BibTeX
@misc{dcefd7c5cee57a,
title = {Strategic Heterogeneity: Welfare Gains from Secession and Immigration — arXiv:2608.06092},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06092},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_efd7c5cee57a; sha256 20c26d4752e36f6cb08d1c96c1d3dac5e2eca05de9b2ccd9d12f713d3fa7e934},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06092. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
This paper investigates the strategic and welfare properties of endogenous population partitioning (secession) within large-population anonymous games featuring strategic heterogeneity. We consider a continuum-player framework with a binary action space where players are categorized either as fol- lowers, who experience positive network externalities from conformity, or as contrarians, who seek distinctiveness via anti-conformism. We fully characterize the set of Nash equilibria and establish con- ditions under which costless secession yields structural Pareto improvements. We demonstrate that in any strategically mixed society, every mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium admits a Pareto-improving se- cession. With finitely many types, secession systematically mitigates coordination frictions, enhancing both individual payoffs and aggregate utility. Furthermore, we characterize social planner configura- tions optimizing weighted aggregate utility, establishing a formal mathematical isomorphism between optimal jurisdictional design and the theory of Bayesian persuasion solved via concavification. Finally, we derive the structural conditions governing migration stability when subgroups can unilaterally re- locate across distinct societies. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-07 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06092 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-31T10:58:32.928Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-08-07?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).