Metraipolis › archive › dc_ef71ca74fa28

Policy Targeting with Market Equilibrium — arXiv:2609.18600

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18600
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-15T18:08:20.919Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: a6a3d44332f7597606444a1e19c0dc6ec5ee900dfac5385cf062cd16772491a1
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ef71ca74fa28

How to cite

Policy Targeting with Market Equilibrium — arXiv:2609.18600 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18600 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ef71ca74fa28 (Metraipolis archive dc_ef71ca74fa28, sha256 a6a3d44332f7597606444a1e19c0dc6ec5ee900dfac5385cf062cd16772491a1)

BibTeX

@misc{dcef71ca74fa28,
  title = {Policy Targeting with Market Equilibrium — arXiv:2609.18600},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18600},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ef71ca74fa28; sha256 a6a3d44332f7597606444a1e19c0dc6ec5ee900dfac5385cf062cd16772491a1},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18600. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

This paper develops a framework for individualized treatment allocation when interventions shift equilibrium prices and generate spillovers across treated and untreated units. The planner chooses which units receive a subsidy while allowing equilibrium prices to adjust endogenously. We show that the resulting welfare function is supermodular under broad and interpretable conditions, implying complementarity across treatment assignments and enabling exact polynomial-time optimization. This structure clarifies how equilibrium spillovers shape the trade-off between universal and targeted distribution and makes the planner's problem computationally tractable despite interactions across units. We characterize when universal or targeted subsidies are optimal and show how market conditions and heterogeneity shape the optimal allocation. We further establish statistical guarantees for plug-in allocation under estimation uncertainty in demand and supply. Finally, we illustrate the framework in a coupon allocation problem calibrated with household expenditure data from the Philippines.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-17 in econ.EM).
Categorie arXiv: Econometrics (econ.EM).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18600 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-15T17:26:28.553Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.EM/2026-09-17?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).