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Adversarial Robustness in Smishing Detection: A Comparative Analysis of Adversarial Fragility in Classical vs. Transformer-Based Detection Systems — arXiv:2608.12889

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.12889
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T04:26:14.993Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
c457a3831c92f9e6a1486ba1406c2a0095b49bcd62956164612aa60164654f8f
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How to cite

Adversarial Robustness in Smishing Detection: A Comparative Analysis of Adversarial Fragility in Classical vs. Transformer-Based Detection Systems — arXiv:2608.12889 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.12889 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ef71454451b3 (Metraipolis archive dc_ef71454451b3, sha256 c457a3831c92f9e6a1486ba1406c2a0095b49bcd62956164612aa60164654f8f)
BibTeX
@misc{dcef71454451b3,
  title = {Adversarial Robustness in Smishing Detection: A Comparative Analysis of Adversarial Fragility in Classical vs. Transformer-Based Detection Systems — arXiv:2608.12889},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.12889},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ef71454451b3; sha256 c457a3831c92f9e6a1486ba1406c2a0095b49bcd62956164612aa60164654f8f},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.12889. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Smishing detection systems are commonly trained and evaluated on clean, monolingual text. In low-resource settings, however, attackers frequently circumvent these systems through character obfuscation, cross-lingual code-switching, and structural perturbation. This study evaluates adversarial robustness for five model architectures: three classical lexical models (Random Forest, XGBoost, CNN+BiLSTM) and two multilingual transformers (mBERT, XLM-RoBERTa), using a dataset of 27,037 messages. Classical models are subjected to black-box generic attacks, while transformers are evaluated with attention-guided targeting. Each model is tested across three attack types and intensity levels, with performance measured by the Robustness Degradation Ratio (RDR). The results reveal a distinct architectural boundary: classical models experience near-catastrophic failure under character obfuscation and structural perturbation (RDR up to 0.988), whereas transformers demonstrate significantly greater resilience (RDR up to 0.351), with structural perturbation representing their most pronounced vulnerability. Effect-size analysis (Cliff's d) indicates a substantial difference between the two model categories. Within the transformer group, XLM-RoBERTa, despite achieving a higher clean-text baseline, exhibits greater degradation than mBERT. These findings demonstrate that clean-text performance is not a reliable predictor of adversarial robustness. Statistical validation using Mann-Whitney U and Friedman tests confirms that these patterns are attributable to model architecture rather than sampling. The results underscore the necessity for architecture-specific defences and frame smishing detection as an adversarial cybersecurity challenge rather than a static classification task.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-14 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.12889 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T04:20:00.557Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-08-14?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).