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Fair Prophets — arXiv:2609.21826

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21826
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-10T01:43:05.602Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
7d1f5bd6416b6934339100bcaa566ab03a3d731ca4581642e2745419f1c70989
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_eef92a803c74

How to cite

Fair Prophets — arXiv:2609.21826 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21826 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_eef92a803c74 (Metraipolis archive dc_eef92a803c74, sha256 7d1f5bd6416b6934339100bcaa566ab03a3d731ca4581642e2745419f1c70989)
BibTeX
@misc{dceef92a803c74,
  title = {Fair Prophets — arXiv:2609.21826},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21826},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_eef92a803c74; sha256 7d1f5bd6416b6934339100bcaa566ab03a3d731ca4581642e2745419f1c70989},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21826. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We initiate the study of $\alpha$-fair prophet inequalities. This interpolates between utilitarian welfare $(\alpha=0)$, Nash welfare $(\alpha=1)$, and Rawlsian max-min fairness $(\alpha\to\infty)$. Given the non-linearity of the objective, it matters when the expectation is applied. For instance, for the Rawlsian objective, it matters whether we aim to maximize $\min \mathbb{E}[u_i]$ or $\mathbb{E}[\min u_i]$. We refer to the former as the ex-ante model, and the latter as the ex-post model. For ex-ante fairness, full distributional knowledge yields a tight competitive ratio of exactly $1/2$ for every $\alpha\ge 0$. Under sample access, $O(n\log n)$ samples per distribution suffice for a constant competitive ratio when $\alpha\in(0,1]$. In contrast, for every $\alpha>1$, no finite number of samples improves upon the trivial $1/n$ guarantee. Thus, unlike in the utilitarian setting, full-information and sample-access prophet inequalities become fundamentally separated. For ex-post fairness, under full information, we obtain a uniform constant ratio for all $\alpha\in(0,1)$, while for every $\alpha>1$ the competitive ratio collapses to $1/n$. In the sample-access model, one sample per distribution suffices for each fixed $\alpha<1$, but no sample budget depending only on $n$ yields a uniform constant guarantee as $\alpha\to 1$. Beyond these phase transitions for $\alpha$-fairness, our results open the door to a broader theory of prophet inequalities for non-linear welfare objectives.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-21 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Data Structures and Algorithms (cs.DS).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.21826 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-10T01:12:41.224Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-21?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).