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Equilibrium Architecture in Multi-Battle Contests with Count-Dependent Prizes — arXiv:2609.02031
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02031
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-17T06:27:42.273Z
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Equilibrium Architecture in Multi-Battle Contests with Count-Dependent Prizes — arXiv:2609.02031 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02031 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ee3242733769 (Metraipolis archive dc_ee3242733769, sha256 d535732c0f164fb6bb5800b61a1be439b3dcc50136cc658f9d749139556b1d23)
BibTeX
@misc{dcee3242733769,
title = {Equilibrium Architecture in Multi-Battle Contests with Count-Dependent Prizes — arXiv:2609.02031},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02031},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ee3242733769; sha256 d535732c0f164fb6bb5800b61a1be439b3dcc50136cc658f9d749139556b1d23},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02031. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Two contestants with possibly different marginal costs compete across identical battlefields governed by a Tullock technology with discriminatory power at most one. A symmetric schedule divides a fixed prize according to the number of victories. Allowing for inactivity, unequal efforts across battlefields, and arbitrary mixed strategies, we prove the existence and uniformity of equilibrium. Equilibrium may be pure, semi-pure (one contestant mixes), or two-sided mixed; in a two-sided mixed equilibrium, each contestant uses at most countably many positive effort levels. Multiple equilibria with different structures can coexist while generating the same expected effort, prize share, cost, and payoff. For every admissible schedule and cost ratio, equilibrium is unique with six or fewer battlefields, whereas seven first permits multiplicity or two-sided mixing. We also characterize all equilibria under majority rule. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-03 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02031 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-17T06:13:32.063Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-03?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).