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Complex Menus in Discriminatory Pricing — arXiv:2611.07128
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07128
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-06T14:59:04.280Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
8e17c86f74d1a543e3439879ce6da728d5b19fc01189a78fbb618f67a9b695d4- Stable URL of this page
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Complex Menus in Discriminatory Pricing — arXiv:2611.07128 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07128 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ee170249b193 (Metraipolis archive dc_ee170249b193, sha256 8e17c86f74d1a543e3439879ce6da728d5b19fc01189a78fbb618f67a9b695d4)
BibTeX
@misc{dcee170249b193,
title = {Complex Menus in Discriminatory Pricing — arXiv:2611.07128},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07128},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ee170249b193; sha256 8e17c86f74d1a543e3439879ce6da728d5b19fc01189a78fbb618f67a9b695d4},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07128. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Advances in technology decrease the costs of offering and choosing from large menus of varieties. As these complexity costs fall, how large are the menus offered by monopolists likely to become? For the multi-product or multi-attribute case, ubiquitous in practice, we show that optimal menus are generically infinite in the absence of complexity costs. Complexity costs can decrease the menu size, but it grows without bound as these costs decrease. These results have no analogue in the single-dimensional model and do not rely on non-linearities in production costs or preferences; the extensive product differentiation is caused by screening considerations alone. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.07128 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-06T14:41:21.099Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).