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A Compute Center Anyone Can Join: A Peer-to-Peer System for AI Inference — arXiv:2611.01865
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01865
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-11-03T11:02:24.858Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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A Compute Center Anyone Can Join: A Peer-to-Peer System for AI Inference — arXiv:2611.01865 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01865 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_edd8162b2ba7 (Metraipolis archive dc_edd8162b2ba7, sha256 af479796adaaae04b97eda87756312b3a32e12d1dcf57bfa11bab6e9c9752c47)
BibTeX
@misc{dcedd8162b2ba7,
title = {A Compute Center Anyone Can Join: A Peer-to-Peer System for AI Inference — arXiv:2611.01865},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01865},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_edd8162b2ba7; sha256 af479796adaaae04b97eda87756312b3a32e12d1dcf57bfa11bab6e9c9752c47},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01865. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Today, most people obtain AI inference by buying it from a small number of organizations that run large data centers, while many GPUs owned by individuals and small institutions sit idle for much of the day. Bitcoin showed that strangers can contribute resources under shared rules and receive checkable rewards, but it relies on an asymmetry: proof-of-work is expensive to produce and cheap to verify. Useful inference has no such asymmetry. We propose the Open Inference Market (OIM), which replaces the missing asymmetry with an economic mechanism. A worker delivers a result without knowing whether it will be audited; its unsettled earnings serve as collateral during a challenge window; and confirmed cheating forfeits all of it. We call this principle earnings as collateral. In a simplified model we show three things. The number of audits needed for deterrence is a constant per worker per day, independent of the worker's throughput, so the audited share falls as the network gets busier. A new worker can join with a short period of intensive auditing and a very small bond. And whether the mechanism works at all depends only on the ratio of the audit judge's false-flag rate to its detection rate. Under example parameters, about 0.3 replays per worker per day are enough to make cheating unprofitable for a rational worker. On this basis we lay out a path that hands four powers back to participants one at a time: owning compute, writing history, judging work, and releasing value. A compute center need not be a building; it can be a protocol that anyone can join. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.AI, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI) ; Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing (cs.DC); Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01865 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-11-03T10:59:45.786Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.AI/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).