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5G-Shark: A Network Security Auditor for 5G Subscriber Privacy and Unauthenticated Signalling Resilience — arXiv:2609.24656

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.24656
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-09T07:01:11.998Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
abbbeae0beba55bd8dcd506f3ba1621ffc3a7f2c295db627ebff2ca342c4b3b3
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_edbe7e420cb5

How to cite

5G-Shark: A Network Security Auditor for 5G Subscriber Privacy and Unauthenticated Signalling Resilience — arXiv:2609.24656 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.24656 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_edbe7e420cb5 (Metraipolis archive dc_edbe7e420cb5, sha256 abbbeae0beba55bd8dcd506f3ba1621ffc3a7f2c295db627ebff2ca342c4b3b3)
BibTeX
@misc{dcedbe7e420cb5,
  title = {5G-Shark: A Network Security Auditor for 5G Subscriber Privacy and Unauthenticated Signalling Resilience — arXiv:2609.24656},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.24656},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_edbe7e420cb5; sha256 abbbeae0beba55bd8dcd506f3ba1621ffc3a7f2c295db627ebff2ca342c4b3b3},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.24656. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

The fifth generation of mobile networks was standardised with an explicit mandate to close long-standing privacy and security gaps, mandating the concealment of the subscriber's permanent identity, resistance to generational downgrade, and protection against location tracking. Assessing whether these guarantees hold in operational networks, however, requires separating two sources of residual exposure that prior studies do not distinguish and do not evaluate in the wild: protocol-design limitations, which remain exploitable even against a fully specification-compliant deployment, and implementation gaps, which arise from incomplete or non-compliant implementations. We present 5G-Shark, a security assessment tool and methodology that turns a legitimate mobility procedure against the subscriber. Rather than relying on active jamming or malformed-packet injection, 5G-Shark manipulates the standardised cell-reselection criterion to pull a target User Equipment onto a self-created rogue cell, establishing an attack vantage with minimal service disruption. Then, the proposed methodology effectively performs the required interactions to expose the security risks of the system under test, classifying them into the aforementioned categories. Built solely from open-source stacks and Software Defined Radio hardware and evaluated against commercial 5G Standalone deployments, 5G-Shark requests subscriber identifiers, forces Radio Access Technology downgrade via crafted Registration Reject codes, and induces denial-of-service states. For each vector, we attribute the root cause to protocol design or deployment non-compliance. We further provide empirical evidence that in several commercial deployments, temporary identifiers are re-allocated in near-sequential steps that keep successive values linkable, a weakness that enables persistent user tracking despite correct subscriber ID concealment.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-22 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.24656 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-09T06:56:01.013Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-22?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).