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The Complexity of Multiplayer Colonel Blotto Games with Player-Specific Values — arXiv:2609.30019

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30019
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T04:52:13.728Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
96ff7bc4fdcd3ada2bc123f9e24a55e6b0ecfca0debcd04c7b33023db609c01d
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_edbb26bddd0b

How to cite

The Complexity of Multiplayer Colonel Blotto Games with Player-Specific Values — arXiv:2609.30019 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30019 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_edbb26bddd0b (Metraipolis archive dc_edbb26bddd0b, sha256 96ff7bc4fdcd3ada2bc123f9e24a55e6b0ecfca0debcd04c7b33023db609c01d)
BibTeX
@misc{dcedbb26bddd0b,
  title = {The Complexity of Multiplayer Colonel Blotto Games with Player-Specific Values — arXiv:2609.30019},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30019},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_edbb26bddd0b; sha256 96ff7bc4fdcd3ada2bc123f9e24a55e6b0ecfca0debcd04c7b33023db609c01d},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30019. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study equilibrium computation in discrete multiplayer Colonel Blotto games with player-specific battlefield values. In the two-player model with common battlefield values, equilibria can be computed in polynomial time. We show that this tractability breaks down in the multiplayer model with player-specific values under the standard uniform tie-breaking rule. In particular, computing a $(c/n)$-approximate Nash equilibrium is PPAD-hard for some constant $c>0$, even when every player has three resources, where $n$ is the number of players. The main technical step is PPAD-hardness for computing a constant-approximate well-supported Nash equilibrium. In contrast, under uniform tie-breaking, a pure Nash equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time when every player has one resource. We also prove PPAD membership for computing $\varepsilon$-approximate Nash equilibria for inverse-exponentially small $\varepsilon$. Finally, for non-uniform monotone tie-breaking, we show PPAD-hardness even when every player has one resource and all players have identical battlefield values.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-25 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Computational Complexity (cs.CC); Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30019 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T04:29:42.578Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-25?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).