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Biased Agents, Extreme Beliefs: Motivated Reasoning Under Competing Models — arXiv:2609.22446
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22446
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-09T06:59:10.430Z
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Biased Agents, Extreme Beliefs: Motivated Reasoning Under Competing Models — arXiv:2609.22446 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22446 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ed370cf6d28d (Metraipolis archive dc_ed370cf6d28d, sha256 a02d82eceed8cfba8950618d3484860f853639eb3cb7bd5f27b98ace0b9970da)
BibTeX
@misc{dced370cf6d28d,
title = {Biased Agents, Extreme Beliefs: Motivated Reasoning Under Competing Models — arXiv:2609.22446},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22446},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ed370cf6d28d; sha256 a02d82eceed8cfba8950618d3484860f853639eb3cb7bd5f27b98ace0b9970da},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22446. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
People often face environments where multiple models compete to explain the same observations. This paper examines how people update beliefs in such settings and how preferences over payoff-relevant states shape model selection and belief updating. This paper first develops a framework where preference-driven bias distorts the perceived model, affecting Bayesian and best-fit updating differently. In a laboratory experiment, most participants are classified as Bayesian updaters, who average across models, while a substantial minority are classified as best-fit updaters, who select the model that best fits the observed signal. Within-participant comparisons between the symmetric payoff and asymmetric payoff conditions indicate that asymmetric payoffs shift reported beliefs toward the preferred state, particularly among participants classified as best-fit updaters. Relative to symmetric payoffs, asymmetric payoffs increase the reported belief of the preferred state by about 8 percentage points among best-fit updaters, while the estimated effect among Bayesian updaters is close to zero. These findings help us better understand model-based learning and have implications for domains such as political polarization and financial investment, where competing narratives and strong preferences often coexist. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-22 in econ.GN). Categorie arXiv: General Economics (econ.GN). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22446 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-09T06:52:42.693Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.GN/2026-09-22?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).