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Learning to Price with Persuasion — arXiv:2608.16699
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16699
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-18T19:08:08.067Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
479343cb97c4ceba255bd6cd8451af08a9ec83a6e33abf1ff872c49ef412ebc4- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
Learning to Price with Persuasion — arXiv:2608.16699 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16699 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ed02689d185e (Metraipolis archive dc_ed02689d185e, sha256 479343cb97c4ceba255bd6cd8451af08a9ec83a6e33abf1ff872c49ef412ebc4)
BibTeX
@misc{dced02689d185e,
title = {Learning to Price with Persuasion — arXiv:2608.16699},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16699},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ed02689d185e; sha256 479343cb97c4ceba255bd6cd8451af08a9ec83a6e33abf1ff872c49ef412ebc4},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16699. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Motivated by modern marketplaces, where the platform or the seller routinely gathers detailed user profiles, we study a novel learning theoretic model that simultaneously involves information and mechanism design. Specifically, we consider the economic setting recently introduced by Bergemann et al. (2022), where in addition to the menu of quality-price pairs, the seller offers information on the value of the match between product quality and buyer's taste via a signaling scheme. We relax the assumption that the seller knows the buyers' belief about the distribution of tastes and study the sample requirements of designing a revenue maximizing scheme. We consider both the batch setting where we have access to data from a set of i.i.d. buyers and an online demand query model where we observe the buyers' behaviors to seller's schemes. Despite the apparent non-convexity of the problem, we also give the first FPTAS to compute a scheme that maximizes the revenue within an arbitrarily small additive loss, which was left open by Bergemann et al. (2022). Overall, this brings a new learning perspective in asymmetric economic settings where buyers and sellers know different types of information. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-18 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Machine Learning (cs.LG); Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16699 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-18T18:12:50.754Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-08-18?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).