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Why Good Experience Can End Joint Activity — arXiv:2611.02292

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02292
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T19:07:14.945Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
0f74356affbe10e65c46b6f6856da74e63b9698f2e199306feea0847dcc0f8e5
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_eb79ab0d3c29

How to cite

Why Good Experience Can End Joint Activity — arXiv:2611.02292 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02292 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_eb79ab0d3c29 (Metraipolis archive dc_eb79ab0d3c29, sha256 0f74356affbe10e65c46b6f6856da74e63b9698f2e199306feea0847dcc0f8e5)
BibTeX
@misc{dceb79ab0d3c29,
  title = {Why Good Experience Can End Joint Activity — arXiv:2611.02292},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02292},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_eb79ab0d3c29; sha256 0f74356affbe10e65c46b6f6856da74e63b9698f2e199306feea0847dcc0f8e5},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02292. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Learning a partner's preferences through joint activity can make both partners worse off than receiving no feedback from the activity. We study a responder who values the partner's payoff but bears a cost when joining is attributed to personal interest. Both partners observe noisy evidence of whether the responder wanted the activity, available only after participation. Evidence of interest raises this cost, discouraging joining on unwanted days; joining only on wanted days would then be too revealing to sustain. With choices based on current payoffs, we derive a condition under which learning can end participation without ever making stopping beneficial to either partner. Feedback accuracy and preference persistence described by couples' diaries satisfy this condition at baseline payoffs. Once activity stops, no further evidence arrives and the belief that the responder generally wants the activity stays fixed, so waiting may never restore it; preference information available without participating can. A separate forward-looking model with highly persistent preferences shows why this remedy can also reduce joint welfare. When participation reveals preferences exactly, a responder may accept at a current loss to establish a lack of interest, making acceptance less revealing and so sustaining participation on wanted days. Free daily revelation outside the activity removes this incentive. At the model's baseline, it lowers the best joint value in monotone Markov equilibria with exact participation feedback, but raises it with feedback as weak as the diary's.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02292 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T18:25:22.740Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).