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Identity Amortization: Shared Resources and the Cost of Sybil Attacks — arXiv:2610.32685

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.32685
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-26T20:07:31.026Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
09608b63248511b0c3a08a1541d1204bc31fcc4735790a638f7eee6b7cdc2b53
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_eb0cdc226040

How to cite

Identity Amortization: Shared Resources and the Cost of Sybil Attacks — arXiv:2610.32685 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.32685 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_eb0cdc226040 (Metraipolis archive dc_eb0cdc226040, sha256 09608b63248511b0c3a08a1541d1204bc31fcc4735790a638f7eee6b7cdc2b53)
BibTeX
@misc{dceb0cdc226040,
  title = {Identity Amortization: Shared Resources and the Cost of Sybil Attacks — arXiv:2610.32685},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.32685},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_eb0cdc226040; sha256 09608b63248511b0c3a08a1541d1204bc31fcc4735790a638f7eee6b7cdc2b53},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.32685. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Sybil defenses commonly price identities by requiring a resource for each one. When one resource can support several identities, an adversary can pay less per identity than the defense intends. We call this identity amortization: a strict reduction in the minimum cost of provisioning identities when resources may be shared, relative to provisioning each one independently. It is a second route to the gap that a Sybil attack exploits. When influence is assigned per identity, a defense calibrated to the nominal price can overestimate the cost of a Sybil threshold by up to the number of identities one resource supports. For any resource catalogue, we give exact tests for when identity amortization occurs, where it begins, and its largest error; a sharing cap below the onset removes it. Because the tests need only prices and capacities, they apply to any defense that admits identities against a shareable resource, telling designers whether the assumed per-identity cost is paid, how wrong it can be, and which intervention restores it most cheaply for honest participants. On published phone-verification prices, per-account estimates overstate provisioning cost 1.6 to 4.3 times; Tor's raised per-address relay limit cut modeled attack cost by 8 to 72%, depending on the address-to-relay price ratio.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.32685 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-26T19:48:33.272Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).