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Dynamic Mechanism and Information Design in AI-Agent Environments: A General Analytical Framework — arXiv:2610.11177

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11177
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-09T07:13:31.790Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: efe99ccfc03680abfb5fedd729713a903bc18c841cf6d22d4406540d5a9886ad
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_eaabbba5142e

How to cite

Dynamic Mechanism and Information Design in AI-Agent Environments: A General Analytical Framework — arXiv:2610.11177 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11177 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_eaabbba5142e (Metraipolis archive dc_eaabbba5142e, sha256 efe99ccfc03680abfb5fedd729713a903bc18c841cf6d22d4406540d5a9886ad)

BibTeX

@misc{dceaabbba5142e,
  title = {Dynamic Mechanism and Information Design in AI-Agent Environments: A General Analytical Framework — arXiv:2610.11177},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11177},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_eaabbba5142e; sha256 efe99ccfc03680abfb5fedd729713a903bc18c841cf6d22d4406540d5a9886ad},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11177. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

This paper develops a general framework for dynamic mechanism and information design with AI agents, encompassing optimal contracting and integrating evolving hidden information and hidden action with partial verification, technological authorization, and multi-agent interaction. It nests conventional dynamic screening, hidden-action contracting, and conditional dynamic information design, while allowing reporting, action, and information-use decisions to interact through a common continuation mechanism. We establish a dynamic revelation principle and a recursive characterization of implementability in which truthful reporting and post-report obedience are jointly determined through continuation incentives. In quasilinear optimal-contracting environments, dynamic envelope and integral-monotonicity methods yield a verification-adjusted dynamic virtual-surplus representation and identify three distinct margins: dynamic information rents, verification rents, and the implementation cost of hidden action. These margins generate a branched hierarchy separating conventional dynamic screening, hidden-action contracting, and their joint problem. We also study the joint design of monitoring, information use, and incentives: more informative monitoring capacity expands the designer's opportunity set, but full disclosure need not be optimal, and information use can itself alter hidden-action incentives. With multiple agents, correlated information, peer discipline, coupled incentives, joint feasibility, and continuation opportunities create additional strategic interactions. Although motivated by AI-agent environments, the framework applies more broadly to dynamic agency settings with similar economic features.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.11177 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-09T07:07:28.002Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).