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Cyber-JEV: Matched Contrastive Fine-Tuning of Language Models for Fast Source-Code Vulnerability Triage — arXiv:2611.02957

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02957
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T18:33:11.105Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
0d3a5f5e8ba48af36322e3c3b2a5e52c4997dbcd24eeccb134328118ab5ff5c8
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ea6ba8675442

How to cite

Cyber-JEV: Matched Contrastive Fine-Tuning of Language Models for Fast Source-Code Vulnerability Triage — arXiv:2611.02957 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02957 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ea6ba8675442 (Metraipolis archive dc_ea6ba8675442, sha256 0d3a5f5e8ba48af36322e3c3b2a5e52c4997dbcd24eeccb134328118ab5ff5c8)
BibTeX
@misc{dcea6ba8675442,
  title = {Cyber-JEV: Matched Contrastive Fine-Tuning of Language Models for Fast Source-Code Vulnerability Triage — arXiv:2611.02957},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02957},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ea6ba8675442; sha256 0d3a5f5e8ba48af36322e3c3b2a5e52c4997dbcd24eeccb134328118ab5ff5c8},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02957. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Single-pass scoring models such as Jev give each code function a vulnerability probability, so that security teams can rank many functions for review without generating written explanations. Training an open-weight model for this task is limited by data. Benchmarks with both vulnerable and non-vulnerable labels keep few vulnerable functions once examples related to the test data are removed, while larger public vulnerability records mostly contain vulnerable functions only. Mixing the two lets the data source predict the label, and training on the labeled data alone leaves a model that often scores a fixed function above its vulnerable original. We present Cyber-JEV, a fine-tuning method that uses fix commits to turn these records into comparison groups. Each group holds a vulnerable function, its patched version and up to two unchanged functions from the same file, so the model sees the change that removed a recorded defect. One shared model learns two tasks: classifying functions from the labeled reference data, and ranking the vulnerable function above the other members of its group. At test time the input is one function and the output is a vulnerability score. On a test benchmark of 7,270 functions, an ensemble of five fine-tuned Qwen3.5-4B models reaches an area under the receiver operating characteristic curve of 0.814, compared with 0.743 for Jev 1.13. With the 4,031 alerts of Jev as the review budget, it misses 16 of 322 vulnerable functions instead of 39. Compared with training on the reference data alone, it ranks the vulnerable version above the patched version 14.8 to 29.2 percentage points more often on three sets of real fixes. Such scores can order the changed functions of a pull request or a release for review under a fixed budget.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.02957 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T18:12:23.807Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).