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Tournaments with Managerial Discretion — arXiv:2609.04068
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04068
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-17T03:22:35.312Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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How to cite
Tournaments with Managerial Discretion — arXiv:2609.04068 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04068 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ea0a3e4de91e (Metraipolis archive dc_ea0a3e4de91e, sha256 a1407be1d567ebba14956228b23f660571cce7f02daf6871aeaeea88b6a67bfd)
BibTeX
@misc{dcea0a3e4de91e,
title = {Tournaments with Managerial Discretion — arXiv:2609.04068},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04068},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ea0a3e4de91e; sha256 a1407be1d567ebba14956228b23f660571cce7f02daf6871aeaeea88b6a67bfd},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04068. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We study tournaments with managerial discretion in hiring. A manager selects a coworker from a pool of candidates and then competes against him in a Lazear--Rosen--style tournament with a prize equal to a share of total output. A profit-maximizing principal sets the prize share together with a head start (or handicap)---an advantage (or disadvantage) in the output comparison---granted to the manager. The head start affects output through three channels: (i) encouraging the manager, (ii) discouraging the new hire, and (iii) inducing the manager to hire a stronger candidate. The hiring effect dominates the discouragement effect until the strongest candidate is hired; beyond that point, any further head start discourages the new hire more than it encourages the manager. The optimal contract therefore grants a head start just large enough to induce the manager to hire the strongest candidate. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-04 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04068 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-17T03:08:33.218Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-04?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).