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School Choice Problems with Priority Adjustments — arXiv:2609.12558
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12558
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T04:25:14.813Z
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School Choice Problems with Priority Adjustments — arXiv:2609.12558 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12558 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ea0494ddf527 (Metraipolis archive dc_ea0494ddf527, sha256 65c81cc3488e6601cef92f33b7b087da7995f8e2837e627d43fb8409576506db)
BibTeX
@misc{dcea0494ddf527,
title = {School Choice Problems with Priority Adjustments — arXiv:2609.12558},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12558},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ea0494ddf527; sha256 65c81cc3488e6601cef92f33b7b087da7995f8e2837e627d43fb8409576506db},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12558. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
This paper studies school choice when each school has an original priority order and an adjusted priority order reflecting policies such as affirmative action. We introduce a weak notion of stability that permits justified envy under one priority order only when the opposite priority relation is supported by the other. We characterize weakly stable matchings as stable matchings under the intersection of the two priority profiles. Using the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm, we obtain a weakly stable matching that cannot be Pareto improved upon, within the set of weakly stable matchings, for any group containing all improved students by the adjustment. We also show that any Pareto improvement over this outcome necessarily creates justified envy under both priority profiles. Finally, our mechanism is responsive to stronger priority adjustments: the outcome under a stronger affirmative action policy is not Pareto dominated by that under a weaker policy for any group containing all students improved by the stronger adjustment. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-14 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12558 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T04:10:45.350Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-14?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).