Metraipolis › archive › dc_e8ced852ca0a

Group Physical-Layer Authentication and Confidential Beamforming in Non-Terrestrial Networks — arXiv:2610.41579

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41579
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-02T07:48:45.806Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
5cafdc6551f932a687beb9a9bf74cebdf61269642829efc1209ebf293eb5f3e3
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e8ced852ca0a

How to cite

Group Physical-Layer Authentication and Confidential Beamforming in Non-Terrestrial Networks — arXiv:2610.41579 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41579 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e8ced852ca0a (Metraipolis archive dc_e8ced852ca0a, sha256 5cafdc6551f932a687beb9a9bf74cebdf61269642829efc1209ebf293eb5f3e3)
BibTeX
@misc{dce8ced852ca0a,
  title = {Group Physical-Layer Authentication and Confidential Beamforming in Non-Terrestrial Networks — arXiv:2610.41579},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41579},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e8ced852ca0a; sha256 5cafdc6551f932a687beb9a9bf74cebdf61269642829efc1209ebf293eb5f3e3},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41579. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Coordinated high-altitude platform station (HAPS) networks need to authenticate group responses and protect private data under shared power constraints. This paper studies joint group physical-layer authentication (PLA) and confidential beamforming using a fresh secret tag superimposed on private data. For received attacks independent of the current tag, we derive exact finite-block expressions for false acceptance and legitimate rejection. These expressions translate authentication error targets into a required tag signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR). We establish a nonzero asymptotic tag-energy floor and analyze residual frequency offset and peak-power restrictions. The legitimate receiver removes the tag by orthogonal projection, which discards one temporal dimension. For colluding eavesdroppers, we identify the spatial coverage condition under which artificial noise (AN) keeps their SINR bounded as data and AN powers increase together. We jointly optimize the private beams, tag beam, and AN covariance to minimize transmit power under authentication, secrecy, and per-HAPS power constraints. The method combines semidefinite relaxation (SDR), exact private-beam rank reduction, and feasible successive convex approximation. A corrected dual lower bound measures the remaining optimality gap. Numerical results show that increasing the tag length from 16 to 64 symbols reduces the required tag SINR by 7.16 dB. Joint beam design reduces mean transmit power by 27.4% relative to an optimized fixed-tag-direction baseline. The authentication guarantee requires fresh secret tags and excludes relays of the current response.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Signal Processing (eess.SP) ; Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.41579 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-02T07:39:31.071Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).