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CONTINUITY: Security-Context Contracts for Composable LLM Agent Controls — arXiv:2609.05269
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.05269
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T22:29:14.244Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
895dfd8a5333a27dc672e0e60263768ee6ad4d2284df482ffee2c46f4ff609c9- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e8bfb9fd0cf4
How to cite
CONTINUITY: Security-Context Contracts for Composable LLM Agent Controls — arXiv:2609.05269 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.05269 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e8bfb9fd0cf4 (Metraipolis archive dc_e8bfb9fd0cf4, sha256 895dfd8a5333a27dc672e0e60263768ee6ad4d2284df482ffee2c46f4ff609c9)
BibTeX
@misc{dce8bfb9fd0cf4,
title = {CONTINUITY: Security-Context Contracts for Composable LLM Agent Controls — arXiv:2609.05269},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.05269},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e8bfb9fd0cf4; sha256 895dfd8a5333a27dc672e0e60263768ee6ad4d2284df482ffee2c46f4ff609c9},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.05269. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
LLM agent systems increasingly combine provenance tracking, authorization, policy enforcement, protocol adapters, and execution controls. However, individually correct security mechanisms do not necessarily compose into an end-to-end secure system: security-critical context may be dropped, widened, rebound, or reinterpreted as actions cross component boundaries. We identify this failure mode as security-context discontinuity and introduce CONTINUITY, a framework for verifiable composition of agent security controls. CONTINUITY models each component with an assume-guarantee contract and carries authenticated security context across transitions using signed root grants, provenance commitments, role-bound transition receipts, bounded typed releases, transformation witnesses, and effect-bound execution permits. We formalize end-to-end consequence integrity, requiring every realized external effect to be backed by a valid and current authorization witness linking the principal, task, provenance, delegation, policy state, canonical action, and finality boundary. We implement a reference verifier and deterministic cross-layer fault-injection suite covering 32 fault classes across four application domains. In 2,560 parameterized attack instances spanning 128 fault-domain classes, the full CONTINUITY configuration commits no harmful external effect, while completing all 700 benign tasks and escalating all 200 ambiguous cases. These results show that secure agent execution requires not only sound individual controls, but explicit contracts that preserve their guarantees across the complete instruction-to-effect path. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-07 in cs.AI). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.05269 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T22:18:11.583Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-09-07?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).