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Optimal Regret for Online Market Making with Limit Order Book — arXiv:2610.09691

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09691
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-08T11:34:58.785Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
d1634ed4a2ea1e9e6bb8cfe7afef838998a0d28afac2bd9aba4fff0ac5be7b73
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e7f0e41fc537

How to cite

Optimal Regret for Online Market Making with Limit Order Book — arXiv:2610.09691 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09691 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e7f0e41fc537 (Metraipolis archive dc_e7f0e41fc537, sha256 d1634ed4a2ea1e9e6bb8cfe7afef838998a0d28afac2bd9aba4fff0ac5be7b73)
BibTeX
@misc{dce7f0e41fc537,
  title = {Optimal Regret for Online Market Making with Limit Order Book — arXiv:2610.09691},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09691},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e7f0e41fc537; sha256 d1634ed4a2ea1e9e6bb8cfe7afef838998a0d28afac2bd9aba4fff0ac5be7b73},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09691. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study online learning in market making, where, at each round, a market maker posts bid and ask prices before observing the market price and the private valuation of an incoming trader. In this setting, Maran et al. 2026 introduce a feedback model motivated by limit order books, in which the trader's valuation is revealed only if no transaction occurs. Assuming that trader valuations are drawn i.i.d. from an unknown distribution while market prices are chosen adversarially, they establish an expected regret bound of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(T^{2/3})$. In this work, we improve upon this guarantee by establishing a high-probability regret bound of $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}(\sqrt{T})$. As a warm-up, we first consider the full-feedback setting. We introduce a discretization of the bid-ask space based on two coupled grids and combine it with Hedge to achieve the desired regret rate. Building on these ideas, we then address the substantially weaker feedback induced by a limit order book and develop an algorithm that achieves the same guarantee. Finally, we investigate the limits of learnability in fully adversarial environments, where the valuations may vary arbitrarily as well. Perhaps surprisingly, we show that when both market prices and trader valuations are chosen adversarially, sublinear regret is impossible even under full feedback, thereby motivating our stochastic assumption on the valuations.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Machine Learning (cs.LG).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09691 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T10:34:51.747Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).