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Algorithmic Collusion Without Deterrence: Auditing the Punishment Mechanism in Q-Learning Pricing Agents — arXiv:2610.21867
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- arXiv (en)
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- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21867
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T10:53:31.366Z
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Algorithmic Collusion Without Deterrence: Auditing the Punishment Mechanism in Q-Learning Pricing Agents — arXiv:2610.21867 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21867 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e79739016de1 (Metraipolis archive dc_e79739016de1, sha256 5e25ad8e486cd195e476247fda0251f4c456e66c17a7fab047230ef8f10a2a99)
BibTeX
@misc{dce79739016de1,
title = {Algorithmic Collusion Without Deterrence: Auditing the Punishment Mechanism in Q-Learning Pricing Agents — arXiv:2610.21867},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21867},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_e79739016de1; sha256 5e25ad8e486cd195e476247fda0251f4c456e66c17a7fab047230ef8f10a2a99},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21867. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Independent tabular Q-learning agents repricing in a simulated Bertrand duopoly converge to supracompetitive prices, and the seminal evidence attributes this to a learned reward-punishment scheme: undercut your rival and it retaliates, so deviation never pays. This mechanistic reading is what turns high prices into a cartel, and into a regulatory target. We replicate the environment of Calvano et al. (2020) and confirm their impulse-response pattern within co-trained pairs. We then audit the pattern on frozen policies, with learning off, and find that on its own it does not identify a mechanism: the return is over-determined rather than selective. In nine of ten converged pairs (914 of 1,024) a single attractor's basin is the entire state space, so every perturbation returns whatever provoked it, and a forced price increase triggers the same retaliatory pattern as an undercut. What co-training produces is a narrow, dyad-specific basin of attraction: re-match frozen agents from independent runs, as Calvano et al. did with learning on, and coordination collapses by 80% with nothing carried across. The deterrence claim is incomplete on its own terms: the one-period undercut of Calvano et al.'s impulse-response test is unprofitable, which we confirm in 92% of pairs, but the optimal deviation, computed by dynamic programming against each partner's frozen strategy, profits by 17.5% on average. The scheme deters only the deviation no optimizer would choose; collusion survives because deviation is never tried, not because it would not pay. Supracompetitive prices are robust; the punishment mechanism read into them does not survive these tests, which changes what the standard test of algorithmic collusion establishes, and what pairing-disruption remedies can be expected to do. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv q-fin.CP, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Computational Finance (q-fin.CP). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21867 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T09:01:07.383Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/q-fin.CP/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).